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become too expansionary and inflation is
rising, then selling foreign exchange and
draining bank reserves is consistent both
with resisting a depreciation and prevent-
ing inflation. If, on the other hand, mone-
tary policy is achieving its inflation objec-
tive, but the domestic currency is
depreciating because residents elect to
import more goods, then selling foreign
exchange and draining bank reserves
resists depreciation only at the expense 
of generating deflation. As a general rule,
only when the underlying exchange rate
disturbance stems from domestic mone-
tary policies will intervention remain
compatible with a central bank’s inflation
objective. Under any other type of distur-
bance, an inevitable conflict between 
policy goals ensues. 
Sterilization is also particularly impor-
tant in the United States because the
U.S. Treasury holds primary responsibil-
ity for intervention. In the absence of
sterilization, the Treasury’s foreign
exchange operations could affect bank
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A growing number of observers seem
to believe that official foreign exchange
intervention offers a useful tool for
managing the dollar’s descent. In
particular situations, official transac-
tions can sometimes produce tempo-
rary changes in exchange rates, but
intervention does not permit coun-
tries to avoid or substantially modify
trends in the movements of their
exchange rates. At best, intervention
is of very limited value. 
Once was the time when learned 
people thought that the sun revolved
around the earth. Indeed, the casual
empiricism of the day supported the
notion. The sun rose each morning in 
the east and set each night in the west.
But, as we all now know, the perception
belies the reality. 
Now is the time, with the dollar’s value
sliding sharply against the euro and 
yen, that a growing number of observers
—including many economists and 
policymakers— believe that official
intervention offers a useful tool for 
managing the dollar’s descent. This 
perception stems from myriad recent
studies showing that official purchases
and sales of foreign currencies have
sometimes affected exchange rate 
movements over the short term. Much 
of the evidence reflects the experience
of the Japanese Ministry of Finance
since 1991. But do these empirical facts
fit the conclusion many seem to draw—
that such interventions allow countries to
avoid or substantially modify trends in
the movements of their exchange rates? 
To be sure, foreign exchange interven-
tions can sometimes produce temporary
changes in exchange rates as the market
learns about and adjusts to evolving 
fundamentals, but because foreign
exchange intervention does not change
those fundamentals, it ultimately cannot
prevent or materially alter the adjust-
ment process. The value of intervention,
therefore, is very limited. 
■ Intervention and Monetary
Policy
Intervention refers to official purchases
or sales of foreign exchange that are
designed to influence countries’
exchange rates. Except for the instru-
ment involved, the mechanics of the
transaction match those of an open 
market operation, and like any open
market operation, foreign exchange
transactions have the potential to drain
or add bank reserves. When, for 
example, a central bank buys foreign
exchange, it pays in domestic currency
basically by crediting exchange dealers’
commercial bank accounts. The process
injects reserves into the banking system
just as if the central bank had bought
government securities on the open 
market. Similarly, when a central bank
sells foreign exchange to dealers, it 
contracts commercial bank reserves. 
Central banks, however, typically offset
(or sterilize) the impact of foreign
exchange intervention on bank reserves.
Any central bank that conducts its mone-
tary policy by targeting an overnight,
reserve market interest rate—as nearly
all large-country central banks do—or an
aggregate amount of reserves—as the
Bank of Japan does—will automatically
offset all transactions that threaten its
operating target. 
They do this to prevent intervention from
interfering with their domestic inflation
objectives. Conflict between an exchange
rate and an inflation objective is not a 
certainty; it depends on why the exchange
rate is moving in the first place. If, for
example, a nation’s currency is depreciat-
ing because its monetary policy hasreserves, interfere with monetary policy,
and thereby circumscribe the Federal
Reserve’s independence and policy
credibility. 
As noted, intervention and monetary
policy are sometimes compatible, and
central banks sometimes do formulate
their monetary policies with an
exchange rate objective in mind. One
might expect that adding or draining
domestic bank reserves through 
intervention might be better suited to
achieving an exchange rate objective
than standard open market operations 
in domestic government securities.
Unfortunately, available evidence for
the United States suggests that when
intervention and federal funds target
rate changes occur in concert, the for-
mer adds nothing to any exchange rate
outcome. Foreign exchange transactions
seem wholly redundant to normal open
market operations. 
■ Intervention and Exchange
Rates 
When central banks neutralize the
effects of intervention on bank reserves,
they prevent intervention from ulti-
mately affecting money growth and, in
doing so, close a recognized channel
through which intervention could affect
exchange rates. Some economists con-
tend, however, that a second mechanism
could link intervention with exchange
rate fundamentals. When a central bank
buys foreign currency, it injects reserves
into the banking system. If this reserve
provision is incompatible with its oper-
ating target, the central bank will sell
government securities to the market.
While this set of transactions leaves
bank reserves unchanged, it increases
the amount of publicly held government
securities. If international investors are
reluctant to add these securities to their
portfolios, their hesitancy may produce
a depreciation and possibly a rise in
domestic interest rates even without a
change in bank reserves. This theoreti-
cally plausible channel, which could
afford monetary authorities a direct
influence over an exchange rate funda-
mental—the currency composition of
outstanding assets—unfortunately lacks
convincing empirical support. 
Although sterilized intervention does
not directly affect market fundamentals,
most economists believe that it can
influence the market’s perception and
expectations of those fundamentals.
Because information is costly, various
market participants do not continuously
possess the same information about
exchange rates. Survey evidence, for
example, indicates that large foreign
exchange dealers have better information
than their smaller counterparts and other
market participants because of their
broader customer base and market net-
work. Because of these asymmetries, 
new information takes some time—albeit
some very short time—to be disseminated
through the market, and exchange rates
will not continuously reflect all available
information. In such markets, nonfunda-
mental forces like bandwagon effects,
overreaction to news, technical trading,
and excessive volatility may underlie
short-term exchange rate dynamics. Any
trader—including monetary authorities—
who the market suspects of having supe-
rior information could affect prices, if
market participants observed his or 
her trades. 
So queries about the efficacy of interven-
tion typically boil down to a single ques-
tion: Do monetary authorities routinely
possess better information about market
fundamentals than private traders? To be
sure, monetary authorities sometimes
have an information advantage over the
private sector, especially about impend-
ing monetary policy changes, but as a
general proposition, the claim is shaky. 
If the assertion that monetary authorities
routinely have better information and
can reveal it through their trades is true,
then we should observe a clear, persis-
tent correlation between intervention and
exchange rate movements. 
Empirical studies frequently find a con-
nection between foreign exchange inter-
vention and day-to-day exchange rate
movements. Studies using even finer data
discover that exchange rates tend to
respond within minutes of an official
operation. Large interventions, especially
those undertaken with two or more central
banks transacting in concert, are more
likely to affect exchange rates in the
desired direction than small, unilateral
operations. Nevertheless, the empirical
results are not robust across currencies,
time periods, or empirical techniques,
indicating that intervention’s effects are
not a sure thing.
An analysis of U.S. foreign exchange
operations between 1985 and 1997, for
example, clearly illustrates the hit-or-
miss nature of intervention. Following
the Plaza Accord in September 1985,
when large nations agreed to concerted
intervention aimed at fostering a dollar
depreciation, and again after the stock
market decline in October 1987, official
U.S. transactions in Japanese yen and
German marks tended to moderate—but
not offset—day-to-day fluctuations in
the dollar against these currencies. 
Even then, however, success was not a
sure thing; fewer than one-half of the
interventions seemed successful. After
January 1989, the overall effectiveness
of U.S. operations waned, and U.S. 
policymakers sharply curtailed their
operations. Since 1995, the United
States has only intervened twice. Never-
theless, even in the post-1989 period,
one can point to individual interventions
that created the desired movement in
exchange rates. 
Economist Alain Chaboud and I under-
took a similar analysis of Japanese 
intervention between 1991 and 2002,
with comparable results. We found that
Japanese purchases of dollars often
affected the yen–dollar rate in a manner
consistent with the Ministry of
Finance’s overall objectives. However, 
a success was not a certainty. Of the 
182 dollar purchases, we counted 119, 
or 65 percent, as successful. Before
1995, for example, we observed that the
rate of the dollar’s depreciation on the
day of an intervention was often smaller
than on the previous day. In addition, 
we found that the larger, less frequent
Japanese interventions after 1995 were
often associated with outright dollar
appreciations. 
Others have reached similar conclusions
about U.S. and Japanese intervention
and about the exchange rate operations
of other monetary authorities. Sterilized
interventions—those operations that
may affect expectations, but do not
affect fundamentals—can sometimes
produce changes in day-to-day
exchange rate movements that are con-
sistent with the objectives of monetary
authorities. But can we conclude from
this evidence that sterilized intervention
provides a useful technique for guiding
exchange rates along a near-term path? 
■ Drunken Sailors and
Exchange Rate Movements 
We know virtually nothing about the
duration of intervention effects, but if
intervention reveals new information, 
its impact is likely to be permanent.
Unfortunately, sending the exchange
rate off permanently along a different
path does not necessarily change its ultimate destination. The walk of a
drunken sailor—a favorite analogy of
financial economists—helps to illus-
trate the point. 
Imagine a hopelessly drunken sailor
standing atop a steep hill. He heads out,
staggering back and forth, making his
way down the hill. The fundamental
involved here is gravity, and at the end
of his sojourn, the sailor will end up
sprawled out on the sidewalk at the 
bottom of the hill. But our sailor can
take any one of an infinite number of
paths down the hill to his inevitable 
destination. If you come by and nudge
the sailor on his way down, you will
send him off on a different path. You
may send him more quickly to his fate
or you may even send him up the hill
for a while. Eventually, however, the
laws of physics (and alcohol) will hold,
and…thud.
Like the drunken sailor, exchange rates
demonstrate a long-term response to
economic forces and a curious short-
term haphazardness. Macroeconomic
fundamentals do a notoriously poor job
of predicting exchange rate movements
over short time horizons, but these 
same fundamentals do seem to guide
exchange rates over the long run. The
currencies of countries with loose mon-
etary policies and relatively high rates
of inflation, for example, ultimately
seem to depreciate, but this can take
many years. In the meantime, exchange
rates are continuously feeling their way
along a path consistent with the evolv-
ing fundamentals. Moreover, the market
is forward looking, meaning that today’s
quotes rely heavily upon expectations
about future developments. As new
information becomes available, market
participants revise their expectations—
a process that imparts a seemingly ran-
dom, zig-zag pattern to short-term
exchange rate movements (see figure 1).
Reflecting this process, the probability
that the dollar will appreciate or depre-
ciate on any given day is roughly 
50 percent. Trend movements in the 
dollar, however, take weeks, even
months to reveal themselves.  
If a central bank intervenes in such a
market and if its actions provide the
market with new information pertinent
to the pricing of foreign exchange with-
out actually changing underlying
macroeconomic fundamentals, the
exchange rate will jump and begin 
moving along an alternative path. But
the exchange rate will not escape the
pull of its basic economic determinants.
What benefit then was intervention’s
nudge? It’s almost like trying to stop
the sun from setting. 
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